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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERA T. CALLISTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALFRED CYRIL CALLISTER, . 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF 
Civil No. 7967 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as one of the points raised in connection 
with this appeal relates to the interpretation to be given 
to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judg--
ment originally entered by the trial court in the above 
entitled matter, in the light of the agreement executed by 
the parties, respondent desires to set forth briefly the 
facts relating to the action and leading up to the instant 
proceedings in which respondent sought to have the 
original judgment amended as to the amount of alimony 
which he had to pay. 
The action for divorce was originally commenced by 
plaintiff against defendant on May 5, 1945. The com--
plaint as filed requested the court to grant to the plaintiff 
( 1) half of the real estate owned by defendant, par--
ticularly the home located at 44 2 "A" Street, and the 
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property in Cottonwood; (2) one half of the stocks and 
bonds; ( 3) cash in the amount of $1 0,000.00; ( 4) alimony 
in the sum of $600.00 per month and support money in 
the sum of $150.00 per month; (5) certain insurance 
policies; and (6) household furniture and the 1937 Buick 
Sedan Automobile (R. 4). Thereafter and while the ac .. 
tion was pending the parties executed an agreement en ... 
titled "Agreement of Property Settlement and Alimony" 
which bears the date of July 28, 1945 (Exh. A). Upon 
the execution of this property settlement, which also pro .. 
vided for payment of alimony by the defendant, the plain .. 
tiff went into court on the 30th of July, 1945, where the 
matter was heard and the court found that said agree .. 
ment for property division and alimony and support money 
"is just, fair and reasonable" (R. 8). The court further 
awarded to the plaintiff, pursuant to the agreement of 
the parties which the court found to be just and reason ... 
able, all of the items requested in the complaint and 
enumerated in numbers 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 above. As to 
item number 4, however, the court without referring to the 
agreement between the parties reduced the demand 
of alimony from $600.00 to $400.00 per month and the 
amount of support money from $150.00 to $50.00 per 
month. The court in its findings, conclusions and decree 
specifically set out the real property which the plaintiff re .. 
ceived and referred to the securities as "one ... half of the 
securities attached in Schedule A of Exhibit A which is 
attached to the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
on file herein and by reference made a part hereof" 
(R. 20). The decree further provided in paragraph 5 
thereof that "plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded judg .. 
ment against the defendant for alimony in the sum of 
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$400.00 per month during the life of plaintiff or until she 
remarries and for support money in the amount of $50.00 
per month for the support of the minor child" (R. 21). 
The judgment was dated the 30th of July, 1945 (R.23). 
The defendant complied with the decree and made all 
payments of alimony coming due under it (R. 46, 47). 
Thereafter, on July 14, 1952, defendant, respondent 
herein, filed a motion to amend the judgment with respect 
to the alimony payments and requested the court to reduce 
the amount from $400.00 to the sum of $200.00 or such 
lesser amount as the evidence might justify under the cir..-
cumstances. Plaintiff appeared and filed an answer re ... 
questing the court to increase the amount of alimony from 
$400.00 per month to $500.00 per month on the ground 
and for the reason that since said decree had been made 
and entered the circumstances and conditions upon which 
it had been based were materially changed and that 
plaintiff was in need of the additional sum as alimony. 
The matter came on for hearing before the court on the 
28th day of November, 1952, on the motion of the de ... 
fendant and the answer of the plaintiff. Thereafter, and 
while the matter was still before the court-but follow ... 
ing the introduction of respondent's evidence-the plain ... 
tiff requested leave to file an amended answer, which re ... 
quest was granted, and the amended answer, omitting 
the claim for additional alimony, was filed on the 5th 
of December, 1952 (R. 30, 31, 116). The amended an ... 
swer, like the first, admitted that the divorce decree pro ... 
vided "that plaintiff was to receive the sum of $400.00 
per month as alimony." (R. 30). 
At the hearing on the motion no objection was made 
to the introduction of evidence on the ground that the 
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court did not have authority to modify the judgment for 
alimony, nor was the question raised with respect to the 
right of the court to modify the judgment with respect 
thereto until after the amended answer had been filed on 
December 5th. The first intimation that counsel in this 
matter had that plaintiff relied upon the "Agreement for 
Property Settlement and Alimony" between the parties 
as being binding and not subject to modification was when 
counsel for the plaintiff at or near the conclusion of the 
entire case stated "the alimony in this case is a matter of 
contract. We have withdrawn from our answer here, the 
affirmative relief of increasing this alimony. That is not 
our contention" (R. 147). · 
The court after taking the matter under advisement 
with respect to defendant's motion for amendment of 
the decree found that the original decree of July 30, 1945, 
provided in part that "plaintiff be and she is hereby award .. 
ed judgment against the defendant for alimony in the 
sum of $400.00 per month" (R. 151); that since the 
entry of said decree defendant's income has materially 
been reduced and that he has been suffering from a heart 
condition consistant with coronary artery disease which 
has become progressively worse, requiring him to abstain 
from activities producing physical and mental strain or 
from prolonged exertion (R. 152). Based upon the fore ... 
going findings, the court determined that the defendant 
was entitled to have the alimony reduced from $400.00 
per month to the sum of $250.00 per month and entered 
a decree to that effect, dated December 31, 1952. 
ISSUES 
In connection with this appeal, appellant has attack ... 
ed all of the findings of the court without specifying any 
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particular finding and has argued the issues under five 
separate headings. For the purpose of replying to the 
arguments of appellant, respondent presents the follow ... 
ing points to the court for consideration: 
1. The monthly payment is alimony and therefore 
subject to modification. 
2. The evidence supports the finding of the Court 
that the defendant's income has been materially reduced 
since the original decree. 
3. The evidence supports the finding of the Court 
that defendant's health and his ability to earn have be ... 
come impaired. 
4. The evidence supports the Court's findings that 
plaintiff is receiving an adequate income and that the at ... 
torney fees and costs in the instant proceeding should be 
borne by the respective parties to this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE MONTHLY PAYMENT IS ALIMONY AND 
THEREFORE SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION. 
At the outset there should be no argument with the 
proposition that if the provision in the original div~rce 
decree to the effect that the plaintiff ''be and she is hereby 
awarded judgment against the defendant for alimony in 
the sum of $400.00 per month" (R. 21) is a judgment 
for alimony, such judgment is subject to subsequ~ent modi ... 
fication or change by the court even though the decree it ... 
self does not specifically reserve that right. The pro ... 
visions of our statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 30 ... 3 ... 5 
reserve the right of the court to make such subsequent 
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modifications as the court shall deem reasonable and 
proper. See, also, Jones vs. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. 
2d 222. Thus, the sole issue is whether or not the agree ... 
ment between the parties was an independent contract 
of the parties or whether it was embodied in the judg ... 
ment so to be superseded by the judgment and· therefore 
become alimony. An examination of the decree of divorce 
in this case (R. 19) and an examination of the con ... 
elusions of law upon which the court made its original 
decree does not show that the court merely approved 
the contract between the parties but rather indicates that 
the court used this as a basis to aid the court in deter ... 
mining how much alimony should be paid and the court 
rendered judgment for $400.00 per month as "alimony." 
Obviously, from a reading of the decree as well as a 
reading of the conclusions of law it appears that the 
court adopted the identical wording found in the agree ... 
ment between the parties ( R. 12). 
The courts appear to be in accord in holding that 
where the contract is not merely approved by the court 
but is rather adopted and incorporated into the decree, 
that the agreement thereby becomes merged in the decree 
awarding alimony and support money. Any such agree ... 
ment between the parties loses its contractual nature so 
that the court may thereafter modify the decree as to 
the amount to be paid. See annotation in 166 A.L.R. 679. 
In a case heretofore before this court, Jones vs. Jones, 
supra, the parties had entered into a stipulation to govern 
the property rights of the parties in the event a divorce 
was granted. This stipulation was incorporated in the 
findings and constituted a basis for the decree for alimony 
and for the support of the children. On appeal the ques.-
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tion predented to the Supreme Court was whether or 
not the court had jurisdiction to modify the provisions of 
the alimony decree which was originally based upon a 
stipulation between the parties. The court held: 
"The question raised by the first contention 
can no longer be considered an open question in 
this State. In the recent case of Barraclough vs. 
Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P. 2d 792, 793, 
this identical point was raised. The parties had en..-
tered into a stipulation governing the amount of 
alimony to be paid. The stipulation was incorpor..-
ated into the findings and made the basis for the 
alimony decree. The plaintiff filed a petition to 
modify the decree. We held in a Per Curiam 
opinion, that the court had the power to modify 
such a decree. In so holding, we stated: 'In a 
divorce action the trial court should make such 
provision for alimony as the present circumstances 
of the parties warrant, and any stipulation of the 
parties in respect thereto serves only as a recom ... 
mendation to the court. If the court adopts the 
suggestion of the parties it does not thereby lose 
the right to make such modification or change 
thereafter as may be requested by either party 
based on some change or circumstances warranting 
such modification.' '' 
The agreement between plaintiff and defendant (Ex ... 
hibit A attached to the findings (R. 12) and also Exhibit 
A in this proceeding) indicates that the parties are using 
the written memorandum for the purpose of settling the 
differences and claims with respect to "property, alimony, 
support money, attorneys fees, and court costs." The 
stipulation shows that a divorce proceeding was already 
in process between the parties, t~e complaint having been 
filed on April 7, 1945 (R. 6). The agreement between the 
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parties was made on the 28th day of July, 1945, while 
the decree of the court was entered on the 30th day of 
July, 1945. The decree recites throughout that this is for 
the purpose of settling the differences between the parties 
as to alimony and property and refers in paragraph three 
that the second party pay to the first party as "alimony" 
the sum of $400.00 per month. This is undoubtedly a 
compromise between the amount asked for by the plain ... 
tiff in her complaint wherein she requested alimony in 
the sum of $600.00 per month on both her first cause 
of action and also on her second cause of action. 
In the case of Alder vs. Alder, ( 1940) 3 7 3 Ill., 361, 
26 N.E. 2d 504, (Writ of Certiorari denied in 1940, 311 
U.S. 670, 85 L.ed 430, 61 S.CT. 29) the court in that 
case had before it the question of a modification of a 
decree and held as follows: 
"Respondent could rely on the contract for 
the payment, and in the event of a breach of any 
of its parts could bring appropriate action for the 
enforcement of its provisions, or she had the right 
with the approval of petitioner to have a consent 
decree entered adopting the provisions of the agree ... 
ment. The latter action having been taken, the pro ... 
visions for quarterly payments to respondents as 
provided in the supplemental trust indenture and 
trust agreement of December 1, 1922, became 
merged in the decree. The fact that the decree 
adopted the terms of the agreement did not destroy 
or defeat the power of the court to alter such pro--
visions when a change of circumstances justified a 
modification. Maginnis vs. Maginnis, 323 Ill. 113, 
153 NE. 654; Herrich vs. Herrich, supra; Camp 
vs. Camp, 158 Mich. 221, 122 NW. 521." 
The case of Hough vs. I-Iough ( 194 5) 26 c~l. 2 ~: 
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605, 160 P. 2d 15, presented a similar question involving 
a separation agreement between the parties and a sub..-
sequent divorce decree in which this ·agreement was in..-
corporated. There the court held: 
"Turning first to the relation between the 
separation agreement and the divorce decree, it ap..-
pears to be well settled that if the agreement is 
presented to the court in a divorce proceeding for 
adjudication, and the agreement, or a part there..-
of, is incorporated in the decree and made a part 
thereof, the part so incorporated is merged in the 
decree .... In Holloway vs. Holloway ( 1935) 130 
Ohio St. 214, 198 NE 579, 154 ALR 439, supra, 
the issue involved was whether a holding for con..-
tempt for failure to pay support allowances under 
a divorce decree which was based upon a separa..-
tion agrement incorporated therein would be an 
unlawful imprisonment for debt, and the court held 
it would not because the obligation was on the 
decree and not the agreement, stating at page 580: 
' ... A decree which incorporates an agreement is 
a decree of court nevertheless, and as soon as in..-
corporated into the decree the separation agree ... 
ment .is superseded by the decree, and the obliga ... 
tions imposed are not those imposed by contract, 
but are those imposed by decree, and enforceable 
as such. Once the contract is merged into the · 
decree, the value attaching to the separation agree .. 
ment is only historical.' " (Italics added). 
The case of Barraclough vs. Barraclough, supra, de ... 
cided by this court in 1941 and also cited by appellant 
in her brief in which the court has stated: 
"However, the law with respect to property 
settlements not being applicable to situations where 
alimony is involved, we need not enter into a dis..-
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cussion of the above rule, which we conclude that 
the 'stipulation' the substance of which was incor .. 
porated by the court in its decree, was not a prop .. 
erty settlement but an agreement as to what 'ali .. 
·many' the court might award appellant in case a 
divorce was granted. It did not constitute a settle .. 
ment of property rights between the parties. The 
agreement was just what it said it was, to wit: a 
'stipulation' as to what appellant was willing the 
court should award her as alimony. And the decree 
was so treated as an award of alimony by both 
parties and the court. On two different occasions 
appellant sought the assistance of the court in com .. 
pelling respondent to abide by its terms or be 
punished for contempt. The court willingly ex .. 
ercised its contempt power to enforce the decree; 
and respondent made no objection to such pro .. 
cedure on the ground that the decree sought to be 
enforced was not one for alimony. 
· "Therefore, the trial court erred in deter .. 
mining that the agreement here constituted a 'com.-
plete and final settlement of all alimony between 
the parties, and that such settlement has become a 
final judgment as to alimony :t- :t- :t- insofar as a 
petition to modify is concerned.' In a divorce ac .. 
tion the trial court should make such provision for 
alimony as the present circumstances of the parties 
warrant, and any stipulation of the parties in 
respect thereto serves only as a recommendation to 
the court. If the court adopts the suggestion of 
the parties it does not thereby lose the right to 
make such modification or change thereafter as 
may be requested by either party based on some 
change in circumstances warranting such modifica .. 
tion. And where an appeal is taken from the judg .. 
ment of the trial court in such case we will review 
the record to determine whether or not the appli.-
10 
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cant is entitled to the relief sought in the petition 
to modify the alimony decree. Hampton vs. Hamp ... 
ton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P. 2d 419; Openshaw vs. 
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P. 2d 364." 
In the instant matter it vvas conceded by all of the 
parties to this proceeding that the decree for alimony was 
subject to modification since both plaintiff and defendant 
originally requested the court to modify the decree-
plaintiff seeking to increase the award while defendant 
sought to decrease it. In her amended answer plaintiff 
further admitted "that said decree provided that plaintiff 
was to receive the sum of $400.00 per month as alimony." 
Nor did plaintiff raise any affirmative defense with respect 
to the purported binding and conclusive nature of the 
Agreement for Property Settlement and Alimony in the 
pleadings filed in the case. In view of these facts the 
court might well say as it did in ·the Barraclough Case, 
supra, "the decree was so treated as an award of alimony 
by both parties and the court." 
Insofar as the. agreement of the parties in · this case 
is concerned it treats of the subject of property settle ... 
ment as well as the subject of alimony. Under the first 
provision plaintiff was to receive in effect one ... half of all 
of defendant's property - both real and personal. This 
property settlement was complied with and is not in dis ... 
pute. The parties also agreed upon the amount of alimony 
which appellant was to receive, it being the position of 
the respondent herein that the alimony provision stands 
in the same position as a stipulation between the parties as 
to the amount the court could award as alimony. This 
was in fact adopted by the court in the decree which is 
referred to herein. 
11 
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As hereinbefore stated, every divorce decree in this 
state in which alimony is granted to the party must be 
deemed to have been made or entered by the court sub ... 
ject to the provisions of our code, Section 30 ... 3 ... 5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which authorizes the court to 
modify or revise the decree in case of a change of circum ... 
stances or where the conditions of the parties have been 
materially altered. See Buzzo vs. Buzzo ( 1915) 45 Utah 
625, 148 Pac. 362. 
The California court has summarized this position 
in the case of Johnson vs. Johnson ( 1930) 104 Cal. App. 
283, 285 Pac. 902, 904: 
"When the court awards alimony to an in ... 
nocent wife it is not bound by the terms of a con ... 
tract between the parties, either as to its amount or 
its duration. The power to make the award is 
drawn from the terms of the statute and not from 
the agreement of the husband and wife. It follows 
that the power to modify the award of alimony, 
either as to amount, duration, or time and manner 
of payment, is inherent in the court, unhampered 
by the terms of -any contract which the parties 
might have entere.d into providing for the payment 
of any such alimony, when it is given in the order 
or decree as mainn!nance only. Smith vs. Superior 
Court, 89 Cal. App. 177, 264 P. 573; Soule vs. 
Soule, 4 Cal. App. 97, 87 P. 205; Gates vs. Gates, 
54 Cal. App. 407, 202 P. 151; notes 58 A.L.R. 
639." 
See, also, the annotation in 109 A.L.R. 1068. 
The \Xlyoming Supreme Court in the case of Lona ... 
baugh vs. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 Pac. 2d 199, held 
that where a divorce decree has adopted in part a contract 
of the parties relative to property settlement in alimony 
12 
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payments, the court nevertheless, under the powers of a 
statute similar to ours authorizing the court to modify 
or amend its original decree, has the power to modify 
the decree relating to alimony notwithstanding such con ... 
tract between the parties. This case was cited and ap ... 
proved and followed in a subsequent case of Buchler vs. 
Buchler, ( 1949) 65 Wyo. 452, 202 Pac. 2d 670. The Su ... 
preme Court of the State of Washington has held in the 
case of Heuchan vs. Heuchan, (1951) 38 Wash. 2d 207, 
228 Pac. 2d 4 70, 4 76: 
"The property settlement agreement is no 
hurdle, however, because, when appellant stipulated 
at the time of his first petition for modification that 
the payment provided for in the property settle ... 
ment agreement were alimony, the payments ceased 
to be a matter that could be controlled by con ... 
tract between the parties and became subject to 
such modification, alteration, and revision by the 
court 'as circumstances may require.' " 
So in the present case the parties hereto had enter ... 
ed into an agreement whereby the vJife was to receive ali ... 
mony as therein provided and then incorporated this pro ... 
vision as an alimony payment in the decree, thus making 
it alimony subject to the modification by our court under 
the provisions of the statute heretofore cited. 
Point is made by appellant of the fact the alimony pay ... 
ment is supposed to continue during the lifetime of the wife 
or until she shall remarry. Thus, it is argued, this is not a 
proper alimony payment but is based upon a contractual 
relation between the parties. This court, in the case of 
Murphy vs. Moyle, ( 1898) 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010, 
referred to the laws of Utah, 1888, which read substan ... 
13 
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tially the same as present statute, Section 30 ... 3 ... 5 and 
stated: 
"This statute is broad and comprehensive. 
Under it the court has power to make such a decree 
as the circumstances may warrant, and doubtless, if 
there is danger of the father squandering the estate, 
or if, from hostility or other cause he is likely to 
refuse maintenance to his wife, or support to his 
children awarded to her, and thus leave the chil .. 
dren to be supported by the mother without aid 
from his estate, the court may make such order, 
respecting the property and the suport and main.-
tenance of the wife and children, as is just and 
equitable, and such order or decree may be made 
to continue in force after his decease; and the 
court may afterwards, if occasion shall require it, 
make such change in any decree as 'will be con .. 
ductive to the best interest of all parties concern .. 
ed.' " (Italics added). 
Thus, it is possible that a decree which provides for 
alimony payment to the wife may survive the death of 
the husband. It is within the discretion of the court as 
to whether or not alimony payments have to be paid by 
the husband's estate after his death and until the death 
of the wife. See the notes in 18 A.L.R. 1050; 101 A.L.R. 
326. 
Appellant relies upon the case of Ettlinger vs. Ett.-
linger (California) 44 Pac. 2d 540, to the effect that the 
property settlement could not be modified in the instant 
matter. In the Ettlinger Case the property settlement was 
approved by the court; and the decree provided: 
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that in pursuance of the aforementioned agreement 
the plaintiff do have and recover from the defen.-
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dant the sum of $250.00 per month." (Italics 
added). 
In distinguishing the property settlement involved in 
the Ettlinger Case with a previous case of Armstrong vs. 
Armstrong, 132 Cal. App. 609, 23 Pac. 2d 50, the Su ... 
preme Court of California stated: 
"The instant case, as distinguished from the 
one just cited, presents an express confirmation and 
adoption by the court of the property settlement 
agreement. The court was therefore without juris ... 
diction to thereafter modify its provisions.'' 
The court further stated: 
"In our opinion, the contract suggests that 
such payments were to be made to and received by 
plaintiff as part of the property settlement and in 
lieu of property rights. This would appear to have 
been recognized in both the interlocutory and final 
decrees of divorce for each provides that 'neither 
the making of this decree nor anything herein con ... 
tained shall in any manner modify, restrict, affect 
or prejudice the provisions or any of them, of said 
agreement hereinabove mentioned which agreement 
and all of its provisions shall remain in full force 
and effect.' Each decree thereupon directs the pay ... 
ment by defendant to plaintiff of $250.00 a month 
'in pursuance of the aforementioned agreement.' " 
{Italics added). 
Thus, in the Ettlinger Case the court had before it 
an agreement of property settlement only and not one 
of property settlement with an additional provision with 
respect to alimony, which the court was required to pass 
upon. In the instant matter, the court in its decree referred 
to the agreement when it came to the matter of the division 
of the property, lfz of the real and personal property being 
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decreed and set aside to the plaintiff in paragraph 3 of 
the decree. Paragraph 5, however, of the decree, relates to 
the matter of alimony and makes no reference to the 
agreement between the parties in awarding to the Plaintiff 
the sum of $400.00 per month during her life or until 
she remarries. 
With respect to the provision in the decree to the 
effect that the alimony shall be paid until plaintiff re .. 
marries, such provision itself is an indication that it is 
alimony and not an award of property in lieu of alimony. 
In the case of Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal. App., 2d 526, 112 Pac. 
Zd 780, the property settlement agreement and the decree 
in connection with the divorce each provided that the pay .. 
ments would continue following the remarriage of the 
plaintiff. In that case after the plaintiff remarried the ap .. 
pellant moved to modify the decree and eliminate further 
payments accruing after such marriage and the court in 
refusing to modify the decree stated: 
"The further clause that 'said (monthly) pay .. 
ments to continue even in the .event of remarriage' 
indicates also that it was the intention of the par.-
ties that respondent should receive the full $2, .. 
400.00.'' 
In the Rich Case the decree of the court originally 
provided: 
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that defendant shall pay to plaintiff the sum of 
$2400.00 as alimony for her support and main.-
tenance, payable as follows." . . . . 
The decree set out the time and conditions of the 
payment and then ended with the provision "said pay--
ments to continue even though plaintiff remarries." Qb .. 
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viously, where the total amount of the money to be paid 
by the defendant to the plaintiff was specified in the 
agreement as well as in the decree and further both the 
agreement and the decree provided that such payments 
were to continue even though the plaintiff were to re..-
marry, the Appellate Court properly required those pay ... 
ments to continue in the event of the remarriage of the 
plaintiff. 
In the case of Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal. 2d 833, 
136 Pac. 2d 1, cited by appellant, the court commented 
on the fact that the agreement between the parties "re ... 
cites that the parties desire to effect a complete settlement 
of their property rights, that the provisions in the agree..-
ment shall be in full satisfaction of all rights to support 
and maintenance." After discussing the terms and con..-
ditions of the agreement and the settlement therein made, 
the court further stated: 
"Although neither the value nor the character, 
community or separate, of the property was speci..-
fied in the agreement, it would seem that the bulk 
of it was set over to the husband. . . . The court 
designated the agreement as a 'property settlement' 
. . . The court found that the divorce decree was 
made 'pursuant to and as a part of a property 
settlement agreement.' " 
Therefore, because of the facts set out above and 
because the agreement provided for the payment of 
$250.00 per month during such time as the parties re..-
mained married and following their divorce, the Supreme 
Court refused to allow the decree to be modified holding 
that it was, in fact ,a property settlement between the 
parties and not alimony. 
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All of the California cases relied upon by appellant 
are distinguishable on the facts from the instant case but 
the statements of law set out by the court in the various 
opinions would indicate that in this particular case the 
agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, insofar as 
the provision for alimony is concerned, was only a atribu .. 
tation as to what the parties felt to be fair and reason .. 
able but subject to the discretion of the court. We there--
fore submit that the evidence supports the determination 
of the court that the provision for alimony could be modi--
fied and that it was not a matter of contract between the 
parties which the court could not change. 
II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF 
THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S INCOME 
HAS BEEN MATERIALLY REDUCED SINCE THE 
ENTRY OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE. 
While not directly attacking the finding of the lower 
court to the effect that respondent's income has been ma--
terially reduced since the entry of the original decree, ap--
pellant proceeds on the theory that the evidence shows 
that Dr. Callister has "voluntarily impoverished" himself 
and therefore such voluntary impoverishment should not 
be a grounds for a modification of the divorce decree. We 
submit that the evidence in this respect does not show 
any voluntary impoverishment. On the other hand it 
shows a constructive effort on respondent's part to build 
up a practice of medicine and to provide adequate and 
wholesome facilities for the treatment of patients who 
might come to him. Dr. Callister testified that the oc .. 
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cupancy and use of the clinic has made it possible for 
him to devote more time to his practice; that he had very 
few house calls and a great deal of his "work is surgery 
and plastic surgery and I am able to concentrate all of 
my efforts in one spot and be able to accomplish quite 
a little with less effort." That the operation of the clinic 
and hospital with his private practice made it easier for 
him because of his physical and mental condition. (R. 
111). 
The case of Osmus vs. Osmu~, 114 Utah 216, 198 
Pac. 2d 233, cited by appellants is in no way applicable 
to the facts in the instant matter. There the court specif ... 
ically stated that the evidence supported the trial court's 
determination that the defendant had "intentionally de ... 
prived himself of the ability to comply with such order." 
The trial court had found that the defendant was in con ... 
tempt of court for failing to comply with the order of the 
court for payment of alimony (the amount of which he 
had voluntarily consented to in connection with the ob ... 
raining of the wife's divorce). The court held that "so 
long as such decree stands, it is incumbent upon him to 
comply with it, or at least to exercise every reasonable 
effort to comply with it. If because cause of change in the 
circumstances of the parties it appears that the decree is 
inequitable, or impossible to comply with, he may petition 
for modification." 
In the instant case the defendant has complied with 
the order of the court and made reasonable effort to com ... 
ply but has sought relief from the order on the grounds 
of change of conditions and circumstances which the trial 
court found to have occurred, and therefore such deter ... 
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mination of the trial court should be affirmed on appeal. 
This court has an numerous occasions had before it 
appeals involving the question of whether the evidence 
was sufficient to show a change of circumstances justifying 
a reduction in alimony. In the case of Hampton vs. Hamp .. 
ton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P. (2d) 419, the lower court re .. 
fused to modify the decree as to alimony and support 
money. This judgment was reversed on appeal by the Su .. 
preme Court on the grounds that the evidence showed 
that defendant's salary had been reduced from about $2, .. 
100 to $1,500. Since the original divorce he had remarried 
and had one child by his second wife, who were de .. 
pendant upon his for support. 
Respondent, in this case, testified that in the year 
1944 his gross professional income was $26,069,08 and 
that after deduction of expenses and depreciation he had 
a net income from his practice of $12,686.91. At that time 
respondent was occupying quarters in the Medical Arts 
Building (R. 92). He testified it was necessary in the 
interests of his profession that he move to the new loca .. 
tion and have a clinic and hospital available in order to 
render better service to his pateints-many of whom came 
to him for plastic surgery where it required that they be 
hospitalized only a short time (R. 93.-95). As a result of 
operating the clinic in connection with his medical practice 
the respondent's gross income materailly increased-but 
likewise the expenses of maintaining his office, the clinic, 
and expenses for nurses, professional assistants, and up.-
keep have increased so that in 1951 he had a net income 
(before payment to Mrs. Callister of $4800.00 alimony) 
of $6699.64. (R. 52). The preceding year (1950) when 
the clinic was operating separately as a noh.-profit corpora.-
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decree was originally entered (Exh. F). In neither 1950 
nor 1951 did he have to pay any Federal income. tax. 
For the first six months of 1952, respondent's net income 
(after interest, depreciation and taxes) was $3653.25 out 
of which he paid appellant $2400.00 alimony. (R. 53). 
Appellant argues that respondent should not be al; 
lowed depreciation as an item of expense. It is noted that 
in calculating his income as of the time of the original 
divorce decree, depreciation was an item considered in 
arriving at his net income. Too, in lieu of payment of rent 
for office space (which was required when Dr. Callister 
had offices in the Medical Arts Building) depreciation 
on the building is taken at the rate of $2500.00 per year 
(Exh. G). Certainly this is not exorbitant rent to pay for 
the use of his quarters and for the clinic. The balance of 
the depreciation is for the equipment used in his profes; 
sion-much of it being instruments which have to be re; 
placed frequently in order to keep up with the standards 
of the profession - particularly in the field of plastic 
surgery. Likewise, in calculating appellant's income from 
her apartment house operations, such net income was 
determined after a generous allowance for depreciation. 
III 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF 
THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S HEALTH 
AND HIS ABILITY TO EARN HAVE BECOME IM; 
PAIRED. 
Very little is said by appellant in respect to the mat..-
ter of respondent's health. Dr. Viko, eminent in the field 
of heart diseases, testified that he was long acquainted 
with both of the parties to this action (R. 34); that in 
April, 1949, he gave respondent a physical check ... up, 
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tion, Dr. Callister had a gross income from his practice 
of only $22,717 ~97, considerably less than when the divorce 
which included an electrocardiogram; that the purpose of 
taking an electrocardiogram is to determine whether there 
has been any heart muscle change; that he then found 
"'nothing abnormal about the heart, and the electrocardio ... 
gram was normal." (R. 35..-36). ·Since that time he has 
examined respondent on January 27, 1951, and again on 
May 28, 1952, on both of which occasions he found heart 
muscle change-there being additional change occurring 
between January, 1951 and May, 1952 (R. 37). He finally 
examined the respondent just a few days before the hear ... 
ing in the instant matter and found that in some respects 
the electrocardiogram was better and in another way 
worse (R. 38). "It showed quite marked irregularity of 
a kind known as auricular premature beats." (R. 38). As 
to the future condition of respondent Dr. Viko testified 
that "this is one of the most unpredictable types of heart 
disease there is. There is very great variation from case to 
case in the rate of progress of the disease. Often it will 
stand still without progress for long periods; there may 
be a period of improvement; there may be a sudden episode 
that markedly changes the course for the worse." (R. 38, 
39). As a result of his findings the witness testified that 
he had advised respondent to curtail his nervous and 
physical activities; to avoid night work as far as possible; 
to avoid long hours of work in his practice; and to avoid 
strain of any kind. (R. 39). 
On cross..-examination counsel for appellant asked Dr. 
Viko if it would not have _been possible for Dr. Callister 
to have been suffering anginal pain in March, 1945, when 
he apparently indicated in a letter (Exh. B) that he had 
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suffered from such pain. Dr. Viko stated that when he 
examined Dr. Callister in 1945 the latter advised the 
witness that he had been suffering from a pain over the 
heart "which he wondered about as being anginal and 
at that time, in my opinion, it was not heart pain." The 
witness testified that he diagnosed the pain as being an 
"intercostal neuritis." (R. 4 3). 
In addition to the testimony of Dr. Viko, which 
stands uncontradicted, we also have the testimony of 
respondent as to his general physical condition, his in ... 
ability to work long hours; the nervous strain he is re ... 
quired to work under at times in order to keep up the 
payments necessitated by the divorce decree. Certainly the 
evidence in this case is much stronger than that in the 
case of Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P. 2d 
364, where the Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
and modified the decree as to the payment of alimony, 
reducing the same, stating: 
"The real question in controversy is: Can the 
husband pay an allowance of $175 per month? He 
says he cannot and that the decree is oppressive for 
that reason. The evidence seems to bear out his 
contention to some extent. His health is failing. Un ... 
less he slows up in his work, according to the testi ... 
mony of his physicians, who seem to be disinterest ... 
ed witnesses, he will suffer a breakdown. His in ... 
come in recent years from the practice of his pro ... 
fession has been falling off and will fall off more 
when he reduces the extent of his practice." 
IV 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S 
FINDINGS THAT PLAINTIFF IS RECEIVING AN 
ADEQUATE INCOME AND THAT THE ATTORNEY 
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FEES AND COSTS IN THE INSTANT PROCEEDING 
SHOULD BE BORNE BY THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES 
TO THIS ACTION. 
Appellant argues that her income (which, together 
with the present alimony payments of $250 per month is 
greater than respondent's) is a result of "prudent man ... 
agement of capital assets received at the time of the 
divorce." We readily concede that appellant has done well 
with the property which she received in the divorce. In 
1951 she received from rentals (after allowance of inter .. 
est, taxes and depreciation-the latter being a bookkeep .. 
ing entry only) the sum of $4,255.85. In addition, she 
received dividends from stocks, interest from loans and 
investments, and capital gains from sale of properties. Cer ... 
tainly this is just another circumstance justifying the modi ... 
fication of the decree. It shows that Mrs. Callister is com ... 
petent to care for herself and provide an income sufficient 
for all her needs, thus making her independent of respon .. 
dent. The award of alimony is not a "penalty" which 
should be enforced against respondent. Under the pro--
visions of Sec. 30 ... 3 ... 5, U.C.A. 1953, the court may make 
such order with respect to alimony or expenses "as may 
be equitable." We submit that the determination of the 
court in the instant matter requiring the parties each to 
bear his own costs was equitable and justified under the 
evidence. There is no evidence that appellant is in finan--
cial need or that she does not have adequate income or 
finances to pay her attorneys. No request was made for 
an allowance of costs or attorney fees pending the action, 
as is frequently done where the divorced wife has no in.-
dependent income and the husband has failed to com .. 
ply with the order of the court. 
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The sole claim which appellant seems to have to be 
allowed attorney fees and costs is that the property settle ... 
ment agreement so provides. However, since the court 
already has discretion to allow attorney fees and costs 
under the statute, the provision is of no effect. Too, this 
was a proceeding to modify the divorce decree-not to 
change or modify the Property Settlement Agreement. Ap ... 
pellant did not plead a violation of such agreement and 
hence there is nothing in this case which would justify a 
determination that attorney fees should be awarded . 
. CONCLUSION 
By way of summary, and in conclusion we respect ... 
fully submit: 
1. The decree awarding plaintiff ... appellant the sum 
of $400.00 per month as alimony was subject to modifica ... 
tion upon a showing of a change of conditions and circum ... 
stances. The parties have at all times treated the decree 
as one for alimony and so treated it in the lower court. 
No issue was raised by the pleadings to the- contrary; 
and the fair and reasonable interpretation to be given to 
the agreement and the decree of the lower court is that 
the provision is one for alimony and not a contractual 
obligation between the parti,es arising solely from the 
written memorandum. 
2. The evidence sustains the findings of the trial 
court as to the change of conditions and circumstances 
justifying a reduction of alimony from $400 to $250 per 
month and requiring each party to bear his own costs. 
As we view the matter the evidence is such that the low ... 
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er court might well have reduced th.e alimony more than 
it did so that appellant should not be heard to complain. 
3. The judgment of the lower court should be af .. 
firmed, appellant to pay the costs incurred in connection 
with this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
DEAN E. CONDER 
Attorneys /or Respondent. 
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